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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
PEARL SPENCER,
)
Plain tiff and Appellant

TR~;~ T~ANSPORTA- ~

SANTA FE
TION CO., a Corporation and
LEONARD RUSHING,
Defendants and Respondents

Case No.
6654

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF CASE
The physical facts were as follows:
Plaintiff was injured ·when an automobile driven
by Rose Sorenson collided with the automobile in which
the plaintiff was riding. The accident occurred on U. S.
Highway 89, betwen Redmond and Gunnison, Utah, approximately one m.ile and a half south of the Gunnison
Sugar Factory. The time was Sunday, November 15,
1942, at approximately 6:45 p. m.
At the place where the accident occurred the road
had a hard surface and was divided by a yellow line into
two lanes, approximately nine feet wide. The road was
straight and wet and was partially covered with slush.
This much is admitted. The plaintiff's and the defendants' evidence differed as to how the accident occurred.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

The difference consisted in plaintiff's evidence which
showed that the bus, while travelling north on the aforesaid highway at the time and place alleged, sideswiped an
automobile, driven by Rose Sorenson, which was traveling in the opposite directi·on, causing said automobile to
careen out of control onto the side of the road on which
the automobile, in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger, was traveling. As a result, the Sorenson car
crashed into the car in which plaintiff was riding and
plaintiff sustained the seri·ous and permanent injuries
complained of. The defendants' version of the accident
differs principally in the fact that they deny that the
bus struck the Sorens;on car. They claim to know
nothing about what happened. However, they do admit
tliat the bus was in the exact location of the accident at
the approximate time the injuries complained of OC·
curred.
PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY
Plaintiff's evidence in chief consisted of the
testimony of four witnesses who were riding in the
Sorenson car proceeding south on highway 89, toward
Redmond, Utah, and of the testimony of the plaintiff
and Maxine Anderson, who was the driver of the car
in which plaintiff was riding.
The four witnesses who were riding in the Sorenson
car told substantially the same story. (It is undenied
except on one point. The defendants deny that the Santa
Fe bus struck the Sorenson car).) They were all
employees at the Turkey Plant in Gunnison. On November 15, 1943, at approximately 6:30 p. m. they left the
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Turkey Plant in Rose Sorenson's aut01nobile and prort>t-ded southward toward their hon1es in Redmond. It
was dusk and the road was wet and partially covered
with slush. Rose Sorenson was driving. En1ma Jensen
was sitting next to her in the front seat, and Ina Sorenson and Cleone Jensen "\Vere sitting together in the back
seat. \Vhen the Sorenson car approached the vicinity
where the collision later occurred, the four women in
the car observed the defendants' bus proceeding toward
them on the highway. \Vhen they first observed the
bus it was crowding the n1iddle of the r·oad and as it
approached nearer they observed that it was over the
middle line and on their side of the road. Rose Sorenson,
who ·was driving the car, thereupon drove the car off the
paved portion of the highway about two feet onto the
shoulder of the road. (R. 122) At this time, her car was
still in n1otion. As the bus approached nearer, she observed the rear portion of it suddenly slide, so that it
struck the front left portion of her car and knocked her
semi-conscious. (R. 112) The other three witnesses
in the car then observed that the Sorenson car careened
and slid over onto the portion of road reserved for northbound traffic. At this same time, the car in which the
plaintiff was riding as a passenger was proceeding northerly about one-half a block behind the bus. The Sorenson car, while out of contr·ol, ran into the car in which
plaintiff was riding, and as a proxin1ate result, the
plaintiff sustained the injuries complained of.
After the plaintiff had been taken out of the car,
and after both cars had ben emptied of all occupants, a
milk truck, traveling in a northerly direction, ran into the
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car in which plaintiff had been riding. It thus appears
from plaintiff's testimony that there had ben three
separate collisions ·on the highway at the time and place
where plaintiff sustained her injuries. This is also
admitted.
It appeared that imn1ediately after the Sorenson car
had collided with the car in which plaintiff was riding,
that Rose Sorenson had explained her presence on the
wrong side of the road by stating that she had been
struck by the Santa Fe bus.
Maxine Anderson, who was the driver ·of the car
in which plaintiff was riding, testified in behalf of the
plaintiff. Her story was substantially the same as that
told by the plaintiff with reference to the events occur~
ring inrmediately before and at the scene of the acci~
dent.
They testified that they had been to Richfield to visit
the parents of Maxine Anderson. On their return trip
to Manti they passed through Redmond. While passing
through Redmond they observed ·on the side of the road
an abandoned Santa Fe bus. As they proceeded northward toward A very Beck's place, which was where the
accident subsequently occurred, a Santa Fe bus passed
them going in the same direction. This bus passed them
while they were on an '' S'' curve, which is approximately
one-half to three-fourths of a mile south of Avery Beck's.
When the bus passed, they observed that it was going
about 35 miles an hour, which was approximately 5 miles
an hour faster than they were traveling.
At the time the bus passed the two girls, they were
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listeninp; on the radio to the ''Inner Sanctum'' program,
which cmne on the air Sunday evenings at that time,
at 6:30 p. m. It was, therefore, sometime between 6:30
and 7:00 o'clock when the bus passed the automobile in
which the plaintiff was riding.
After the bus passed the car in which plaintiff was
riding, the hvo girls observed it proceed northerly on U.
S. Highway 89 to·ward A very Beck's place. They noticed
nothing unusual about the bus. They remembered seeing
the rear clearance lights as the bus proceeded ahead
of then1. \Yhen the bus was approximately one-half a
block in front of the car in which the two girls were
riding, and a short ristance north of Avery Beck's residence, the two girls noticed the flash ·of lights from
another car coming in the opposite direction. These lights
came onto the side of the road on which plaintiff and
:Maxine Anderson were traveling. (R. 249) Immediately
thereafter, this car continued toward them in its travel
until it crashed into Maxine Anderson's car. When this
happened, the plaintiff was thrown violently against
the windshield and was rendered unconscious. She was
unable to tell anything further regarding the accident.
Maxine Anderson said that immediately after the
accident she observed the plaintiff jammed between the
dashboard and the seat. (R. 227) She was unconscious
and was bleeding very profusely around the face. Miss
Anderson, who is a trained nurse, explained that plaintiff had ·an artery cut over her ear, and was bleeding
badly over her entire face. Her leg was also cut and
bleeding. It appeared that her upper teeth were broken
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and those in her lower jaw were loosened. They succeeded in taking plaintiff out of the car and removing
her to the home of Avery Beck. (R. 229)
After plaintiff had been removed, a collission occurred when a milk truck, traveling north, struck the
Anderson automobile.
Miss Anderson related that the four people who were
in the Sorenson car all appeared to be dazed. She said
that she was a little cross with Rose Sorenson and asked
her what she was doing on her side of the road. Miss
Sorenson said, "My God, the bus hit me, I couldn't help
it " (R. 229)
The plaintiff then related, in detail, the nature of her
injuries. She explained dhat she had multiple cuts on
her face and leg, and then pointed them out in detail to
the jury. It appeared that some of these cuts, particularly near her left ear and chin, had left permanent disfiguring scars. (R. 251) It also appeared that as a
proximate result, the plaintiff sustained injuries to
her chin and jaw. The plaintiff had been compelled to
have two upper teeth extracted, and a removable bridge
inserted. She also had to have two lower teeth extracted
and a removable ,bridge placed therein. (R. 253) It also
appeared that plaintiff had ben confined to her bed for
approximately a week, and that she had suffered severe
headaches and pain as a result of her injuries. As a
result of the two removable bridges, plaintiff spoke with
a distinct lisp, particularly when making the aspirate
sounds. The record does not reveal the age of the plaintiff, but no one will question the fact that she is a young
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girl in her 20's.The reeord does reveal that at the time
of her injuries, she was mnployed in Sanpete County,
as a publie social worker.
Dr. Hunter, a local dentist, was called to testify in
behalf of the plaintiff in regards to the work done to
plaintiff's n10uth and teeth, and the reasonable expense
of the san1e.
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
The defendants, in their evidence, disputed only one
fact. They adn1itted that their bus was in the vicinity
of the place where plaintiff was injured, at approximately the time the injuries <QCcurred, and they did not dispute the fact that the Sorenson car had run into the car
in which the plaintiff had been riding, nor did they dispute the fact that a n1ilk truck had collided with the car
in ·which plaintiff was riding. They did, however, deny
that their bus had struck the Rose Sorenson car.
In an attempt to establish that the bus had not struck
the car driven by Rose Sorenson, the defendants .called
the defendant, Leonard Rushing, who was the bus driver.
He testified that on November 15, at approximately 6:30
p.m., he was in the vicinity where the accident occurred.
He, however, stated that he knew nothing of the accident
and was unaware of any noise or bumping which would
apprise him of the fact that his bus had collided with
any object. He did admit, however, that the passengers
on his bus, destined for Salt Lake City, left the bus at
Santaquin and completed the trip in another bus. The
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bus which he had ben driving was returned to Phoenix,
(this bus ordinarily traveled directly to Salt Lake City.
The reason for changing passengers at Santaquin and
retunning to Phoenix without going to Salt Lake City
was unexplained. This was especially peculiar in view of
the fact that the defendant claimed that the bus had
been undamaged.)
The only car that the defendant Rushing remembered passing was a truck just outside of Redmond. This
truck, he observed, resembled a cattle truck and had
dual wheels. ( R. 250) He also explained that the bus
which he was driving is about 39 feet long and carries
35 passengers. When the bus is empty it weighs approximately 11 or 12 tons. (R. 353) On cross examination, the witness Rushing admitted that his bus was
8 feet wide and that when he was driving in one lane,
there was only 6 inches clearing on each side. (R. 367)
The witness stated that between Redmond and Gunnison he was traveling about 35 miles an hour. When he
was about one mile and a half north of Redmond he
passed the truck referred to. The truck which he passed
was traveling about 20 or 25 miles an hour. (R. 376) The
witness also admitted that his bus was the only bus of
any kind that runs between Redmond and Gunnison between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening. (R. 377) (It is
approximately 10 to 13 miles from Redmond to Avery
Beck's place where the accident occurred.) (R. 371)
Defendant called as :a witness, Roscoe Tolstrup,
who testified that he was the town marshall at Gunnison. On the 15th day of November, he was called to
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Avery Beck's place which is ,over a 1nile and 6/10 south
of the sugar factory. HP recPived the call at approximately 7 :00 o 'dock in the evening.
On cross exmnination :Mr. rrolstrup stated that when
he arrived at the scene of the accident, the milk truck
which had subsequently struck the two cars had left.
He therefore stated that he could tell nothing about
what darnage was done by this nrilk truck. (T. 387)
G. \Y. Sorenson was called as a witness for the
defendants and testified that he is an autom~o,bile dealer
at Centerfield, Utah. He stated that he towed a 1937
Chevrolet sedan from A very Beck's place on the 15th of
Nove1nber. On cross examination, the witness admitted
that the pictures shown by Exhibits 3 and 4 did not
reflect the true condition of the car as shown on November 15, (R. 395) and he stated that his mechanic
turned the left front fender of the Chevrolet automobile
over to Mr. Wilkinson some time subsequent to November 15, 1942.
Defendants called H. Leon Embly, highway patrolman, as a witness. He was called to the scene of the accident at approximately 7:30 p. m. and arrived there approximately ten minutes later. (R. 398) He went into
the Beck residence where he saw the injured person,
and had some discussion with Cleone Jensen, which
discussion his counsel did not permit him to relate. (R.
399) The witness stated that the Plymouth car was
smashed in front and also along the left side. The witness also stated that he called highway patrolman headquarters in Salt Lake City and asked them to check the
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Santa Fe bus which was coming into Salt Lake City
that night. Salt Lake City subsequently called Mr.
Embly back and told him that the bus had turned around
at Santaquin and had not come to Salt Lake City as
scheduled. (\Vhy did not the bus come to Salt Lake City~r
On the night of the 16th the witness stopped the north
bound bus in Gunnison and made an observation to
determine if any dan1age had been made to the left rear
part of the bus. He did not observe any. The witness
thought that the bus he had examined on the night of the
16th was either No. 388 or No. 387. He was not sure.
(R. 406) (The bus which the defendant Rushing said
he was driving on the night of the accident was No. 392.)
(R. 358) The witness also checked the southbound bus
on the 17th day of November, driven by Mel Rushing.
There was no evidence of damage on this bus. He also
examined the north bound bus and south bound bus on the
17th day of November. There was no damage on these
buses. (R. 407) He did not know the number of these
buses. (Note that there is no evidence from witness
Embly that he ever examined bus No. 392, which was the
bus driven by Leonard Rushing on the night of the accident.) He examined a bus driven by Leonard Rushing
on Highway 28 on the evening of November 18th. This
was about 4 miles south of Levan. He found no damage
on this bus. (R. 409) The witness admitted that north
of the po,int where the Maxine Anderson and Sorenson
car collided there were tire marks going onto the west
shoulder of the road. (This corroborates the testimony
of the women in the Sorenson car to the effect that they
drove off the highway onto the west shoulder to avoid
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bPing struck by the Santa Fe bus.) The witness testified that in the conversations he had with the plaintiff
and Maxine Anderson subsequent to the collision on
NoYeinber 15, tlw two g-irls had not said anything about
the Santa Fe bus passing then1. (R. 413, and following-.)
On cross exan1ination the witness ad1nitted that he
had Ina de no nwnwrandun1 regarding- the conversation
he had allegedly had ·with the plaintiff and Maxine
Anderson, and that he also had taken no measurements
at the scene of the accident. (R. 419-21) He stated that
the milk truck which had hit the two cars after the first
accident, was an International ton and a half truck with
a rack body and a flat bed. (R. 423) As part of the
cross examination of the ·witness, plaintiff introduced
Exhibit B which consisted of notes taken by the witness
innnediately subsequent to his investigatilon at the scene
of the accident. (R. 437, and following) The exhibit
indicated that Cleone Jensen stated that on the night
of the accident the Sorenson car and bus had collided and that Rose Sorenson said the bus struck
her car. His notes also showed that the bus was due at
Gunnison at 6 :27 and arrived at GunniSton at 6 :45 on
November 15. (R. 442)
The witness admitted on cross examination that he
never put any direct questions to Pearl Spencer as to
whether or not she had seen the bus on the night of the
collision. (R. 447) In fact he admited that Pearl Spencer had never stated anything to him regarding the bus.
(R. 448) The witness also admitted ·on cross examinaion
that when there is a three car collision, it is very difficult
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to detennine how specific dmnage has been caused. (R.
449)
· The defendant then called as witnesses Cleta Cherrington, Leah Cherrington, Mrs. Harold B. Fulmer, Mrs.
Vera Procter and Mrs. Alice Bolton. These witnesses
all stated that they were passengers on the Santa Fe
bus at the time that plaintiff sustained her injuries. They
all stated that it was a stormy night and that the bus
was crowded and that none of them heard or felt any
impact or collision at any time during the trip from
Redmond to Gunnison. After this evidence had been
introduced the defendants rested.
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
The plaintiff called on rebuttal Mr. Royal Whitlock. Mr. Whitlock had been subpoened from Gunnison
for the defendants, but had not been called by the defendants as a witness. In fact, he was mysteriously excused
and directed to return to his home the night before the
defendants introduced evidence on rebuttal. It was necessary for the defendants to subpoena him in Gunnison
in order for him to re-appear as a witness. (R. 543)
The witness testified that on the night of the collision
he and another person were traveling south from Centerfield to Axtel where he was scheduled to speak in Sunday night meeting. He testified that from Centerfield to
the point where t he accident occurred, he saw two automobiles. The first automobile was a· ton and a half
truck. This was about a quarter of a mile south of
Centerfield. After he had traveled another mile and a
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half front where he passed the trurk, he passed a large
passenger bus whirh \Vas proceeding- in the smne direction as the truck. Front the tinw he passed the bus until
he arrived at the scene !Of the accident he passed no other
automobile. It was about one half a 1nile frmn where he
passed the bus to the scene of the accident. (R. 545)
He then related the facts and circumstances surrounding
the collision in front of Avery Beck's place. He was
there when the ntilk truck subsequently ran into the two
parked cars. In fact, he arrived at the scene of the
accident before the plaintiff had ben removed from
Maxine Anderson's car. (R. 546) (This witness's testimony was very important as it showed conclusively that
the only vehicle on the road which could have struck the
Sorenson car, as alleged by the plaintiffs, was the bus
which was within a half mile of the accident when
Whitlock first saw it. The testimony is also important
because it showed conclusively that the only truck which
was 10n the road near the time of the collision, was a ton
and a half truck which was one mile and a half in front of
the bus when the bus was one half mile in front of the
place where the plaintiff had been injured. Consequently
this mysterious truck could not have played a part in the
accident as the defendants repeatedly inferred, but did
not prove.)

SPECIFICATION OF ERROR
1. Counsel for the defendants committed reversible error in questioning Rose Sorens1on on her failure
to have a driver's license. (R. 122-3)
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2. The court committed reversible error in perlnitting counsel for the defendants, over plaintiff's objection, to eontinue questioning Rose Sorenson ,on her
failure to have a driver's license. (R. 122-3)

3. Counsel for the defendants, Mr. Jones, committed reversible error in his argument to the jury wherein
he stated and emphasized the immaterial fact that Rose
Sorenson did not have a driver's license. (R. 558)
4. The court eomn1itted reversible error in giving
instruction No. 6.·
5. The court committed reversible error in giving
insruction No. 9.
6. The court committed reversible error in giving
instruction No. 10.
7. The court committed reversible error 1n its
failure to give instruction No. 3.
8. The court committed reversible error in its failure to give instruction No. 4.
9. The court commited reversible error in its failure to give instruction N1o. 5.
10. The court committed reversible error in its failure to give instruction No. 6.
11. The court committed rever.sible error 1n its
failure to give instruction No. 7.

12. The court committed reversible error in its failure to give instruction N1o. 8.
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13. The court connnitted reversible error 1n its
failure to give instruction No. 9.
14. The court connnitted reversible error in is failure to give instruction No. 10.
15. The court connnited reversible error in its failure to give instruction N~o. 11.

The court connnited reversible error in its failure to instruct the jury as to the legal purport and significance of the failure of Rose Sorenson to have a driver's license at the time of the grievance complained of
and set forth in plaintiff's con1plaint.
16.

PROPOSITION I. THE TESTIMONY INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS OF ROSE SORENSON'S
FAILURE TO HAVE A DRIVER'S LICENSE, AND
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS DISCUSSION
OF SUCH EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JURY CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHICH DENIED
TO THE DEFENDANT A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
TRIAL.
In Specification of Error No. 1, 2, and 3 the appellant has directed the court's attention to the record
wherein the error complained of is indicated. At pages
122 and 123 of the record the following questioning of
Rose Sorens1on by defense counsel appears:
Q How long have you ben driving a car~
A About two years.
Q Why didn't you have a driver's license~
MR. McCULLOUGH: Objected to as incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial, whether she has or has not.
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THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

Q vVhy didn't you have a driver's license, Miss
Sorenson~

A

Well, I just hadn't went and torok one out is

all.
Ever tried to get one~
No, sir.
Afraid you couldn't~
No, sir.
Q Why didn't you have one

Q
A
Q
A

then~

MR. McCULLOUGH: Objected to as unnecessary
repition.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
A I will be perfectly frank with you. Our business
is turkey business and I didn't take time off to go and get
it, was practically the only reason.
Q In two years time you never tried to get a license~

A

No, sir.

Q Afraid this nervousness you feel in driving a car
would stop you from getting one~
A No.
Q On this night you didn't have any right to be on
the highway driving this car, did you~
MR. McCULLOUGH: Objected to as incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial, calling for a conclusion of the
witness.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
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Q You didn't have a license to drive that car that
night~?

A

No, sir.

On page 558, the record indicates some of the remarks n1ade by counsel for the defendants to the jury:
MR. JONES: "Now let us cmne back to their interest. \Vho told the plaintiff and Miss Anderson about the
bus? \Vell, let us go back to that. Who ran into the
Anderson car? The Sorenson car. vVhat car did the
damage-the Sorenson car. \Vho was the one that told
the occupants of the Anderson car about the bus~ The
Sorensons, the ones who had actually done the damage.
Well, if I were driving without a driver's license in these
days I wouldn't want to be investigated either. If I
smashed right into somebody else on the ~opposite side of
the street, on the wrong side of the street, I wouldn't
want to bear the load, if I could get out of it.
So that night they don't tell, only Cleone said anything about the bus. Of course, that is right, because
the others told you they were dazed.''
In BERRY, AUTOMOBILES, 6th Edition, Volume
I, Page 268, Sec. 304, the following general rule relating
to this question is well stated as follows:
''The operation of an automobile without a
license, when one is required hy law, does not
affect the rights of such person, nor of those
riding with him, as travelers, nor bar their right
of action or defense in personal injury actions;
such persons not being rendered thereby trespassers upon the highway."
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In 87 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, page 1471,
the editors have reviewed to date the cases relating to
the question here under discussion, and state the following:
"The later cases are agreed that the fact that
the operator of the 1notor vehicle had no operator's license, as required by statute, will not bar
an action for injuries received, where this omission of duty had no casual connection with said
injuries.''
In ZAGIER VS. SOUTHERN EXP. CO., 171 N.C.
692; 89 S. E. 43, the court stated the above general rule
as follows:
''A collateral unlawful act not contributing to
the injury will not bar a recovery."
In PAGE VS. MAYORS, 191 Cal. 263; 216 Pac. 31
it was held that in an action to recover dan1ages for a
head on collision occurring upon a public highway between an automobile operated by defendant's agent and
plaintiff's automobile, that the fact that plaintiff did not
have an operator's license at the time of the collision
did not make his presence on the highway unlawful, and
did not deprive him of the right of r~covery, such omission having nothing to do with the ~accident. The court
said:
"With reference to the question of the operator's license, it is sufficient to say that it had
nothing to do with the collision. We are not disposed to hold that the presence of the plaintiff
upon the highway was unlawful, and that this was
thus a proximate cause of his injuries or to deprive him of the right of recov.ery. ''
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In CLARK YS. DOOLITTLE 20G App. Div. 697;
199 ~. Y. S. 814 the court held that the fact that the
driver of plaintiff's aut:onwbile, "'ho at the tin1e \vas
driving on an errand for the plaintiff, was an unlicensed
driver, and was thus engaged in the violation of a statute
requiring the licensing of operators or chauffeurs of
nwtor vehicles, would not prevent the plaintiff from
recovering for danmge to the car caused by the negligence
,of defendant. The court said:
''But a Inere violation of some prov1swn of
the highway law, casual and not wilful, does not
make the driver of an automobile a trespasser
upon the highway, without civil rights, so that all
others may abandon observance of the rules of the
road and the p:vovisions of protective statutes
in their relations to him. His right to recover, and
the right of another by whom he is employed are
not taken away because at the time of the injury
he was disobeying a statute, which in no way contributed to the injury."
The foregoing cases and authorities correctly state
the law. They do not simply represent a weight of authority; there is no law that conflicts. If then the law clearly
holds that failure to have a driver's license is iminaterial
unless some causal connection is shown, what possible
justification did counsel f,or the defendant have in inquiring of Rose Sorenson on cross examination about
whether or not she had such a license? And what justification did counsel have in arguing the matter to the jury
when the record clearly indicated that the failure to have
a driver's license had nothing whatsoever to do with the
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plaintiff's injuries? There could have been only one
purpose, and that was to influence the jurors into believing that Rose Sorenson had no right upon the highway, and to thus lead the jury into believing that her unlawful failure to have a license was the cause of the
accident.
This errone·ously admitted evidence and argument
was rendered n1ore harmful to the plaintiff by the fact
that the court refused to instruct the jury that failure to
have a driver's license was immaterial. Plaintiff requested such an instruction in her requested instructions
Nos. 9 and 11. The court refused both instructions and
in fact failed to give any instruction on the question of
whether 'O:r not failure to- have a driver's license was
i1nmaterial or not.
Plaintiffs have specified such refusal as error in
specification of error Nos. 13, 15, and 16. The jurors
were thus left to speculate upon a question upon which
the law permits no speculation. Oounsel for the defendants took full advantage of this situation in his argument
to the jury and indicated by his remarks that failure to
have the driver's license was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. We submit that such evidence and comment constitutes reversible error, particularly in view
of the fact that the court refused to instruct the jury
on the law applicable to such evidence.
PROPOSITION II. THE COURT ERRED IN
LIMITING THE JURY TO THE QUESTION OF
'VHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT'S BUS STRUCK
THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVEN BY ROSE SOREN-
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SO~. ~-\ND

ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT IF SAID BUS CROvVDED ROSE
SORENSON'S CAR OFF Tl-IE ROAD AND THEREBY PROXIM_A_TELY CONTRIBUTED TO PLAI~
TIFF'S !~JURIES THEN SAID BUS COMPANY
"\VOULD BE LIABLE.
The court refused t~o give plaintiff's requested instruction ~o. 7, and by the court's instructions Nos. 6,
9, and 10 positively instructed the jurors that they must
find that the defendant bus struck Rose Sorenson's car,
and that if they found that it did not come in contact
with said vehicle driven by Rose Sorenson, then they
must find for the defendant.
Thus, even though the jury may have found, as the
evidence certainly justified, that the bus may have forced
the Rose Sorenson car off of the road and rendered it
thereby uncontrollable, such evidence under the court's
instructions would not justify a finding in favor of the
plaintiff.
The only theory upon which the court could sustain
such a limitation would be on the theory that plaintiff's
proof must be strictly limited to the pleadings, and that
evidence outside of an actual striking of the Sorenson
car constituted a variance.
vVe do not understand that such a strict interpretation is proper in a code state, where substantial justice is
of more importance than a technician's rule of com1non
law pleading.
In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. 41, page
554, Sec. 380 the following is written:
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''The question of variance is in the absence
of statutory provisions to the contrary, determined by the court from the ineoherence of the
statements on their face and the inference which
the court may be able to draw as to their effect
upon the state of the party's preparation. A new
principle of determination has been introduced
by some codes. They prescribe that no variance
between the allegation and proof shall be deemed
material unless it misleads the adverse party to
his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense. But they do not leave it to the court, unaided by proof, to say that the variance is or is
not material. On the contrary they require that
it be shown by proof aliunde and to the satisfaction of the CJourt that the alleged variance misled
the complaining party to his prejudice. The burden is upon the party complaining of the variance to show that he has been misled."
Defendant cannot possibly show that he has been
misled by a theory which permits the jurors to find that
defendants' bus crowded Rose Sorenson's car off the
road so that the same became unmanageable and ran into
the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding. Can defendants complain if the evidence fails to show all that
plaintiffs allege and shows merely an actionable part of
it~

Plaintiffs allege that the defendant bus came onto
the wrong side of the road and struck the Sorenson car.
There was practically undeniable evidence that the defendant bus, traveling on a narrow country road,
crowded the Sorenson car off of the highway onto the
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wet and slipery shoulder of the road. The sharp issue
arose on \Yhether or not the Sorenson car was struck
by the bus. The jury Inay very well have concluded that
the bus crowded the Sorenson car off of the road but
failed to con1e in actual contact with it. This is actionable negligence, and the jury under proper instructions
should have been pennitted to so find. The court refused
to so instruct.
In UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943 Vol. 6 10414-1 it is provided as follows:
''No variance betwen the allegations in a
pleading and the proof is to be deemed rna terial,
unless it has actually misled the adverse party to
his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. Whenever it appears that
a party has been so misled, the court may order
the pleading to be amended upon such terms as
may be just.''
Under this liberal rule of construction the Utah
courts have permited a defendant who alleged he was an
owner of certain property t,o prove that he had simply
a leasehold interest. OLSEN VS. TRIANGLE MIN.
CO., 50 Utah 521; 167 Pac. 813 .
.Certainly a plaintiff who has introduced competent
evidence to the effect that a defendants' bus struck a
third car while crowding it off the road, thus causing
said third car to crash into the car in which plaintiff
sustained injuries should not be precluded from recovery
simply because the jury finds that the bus only crowded
the third car off of the road, and did not actually strike
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it. Such a plaintiff cannot consistently and effectively
plead both that the bus struck the third car, and also
that the bus failed to strike the car, but did succeed in
crowding it off of the road. Plaintiffs allege their strongest ease. If their proof fails to substantiate all they
allege but does prove actionable negligence which does
not n1islead the defendant, plaintiff should be entitled
t,o recover.
CONCLUSION:
The foregoing authorities clearly show the following: 1. That all authorities agree and hold that evidence
of failure to have a driver's license is immaterial unless
there is son1e eausal connection between the failure to
have the license, and the injuries complained of. Such a
causal cop_nection is not shown, but is actually
affirn1atively rebutted by all the evidence. In spite of this
fact defendants introduced evidence of the failure to have
such a license, and commented upon such failure in their
argument to the jury. The error was rendered more
grievous by the f,act that the court failed and refused
to give plaintiff's corrective instructions, and failed to
give any instructions which would correct the erroneous
impression created and emphasized in the minds of the
jurors. 2. The court erroneously instructed the jury
that failure to prove that the defendants' bus actually
struck the Rose Sorenson ear constituted failure to prove
a case against the defendants. The jury was thus instructed that even though they may have found that the
defendant bus crowded the Sorenson car off of the road
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so that it beeame uneontrollable and caused the injuries
eomplained of, still pl,aintiff could not recover. For these
reasons we feel that plaintiff was denied a fair and impartial trial.
Respectfully submitted

:McCULLOUGH AND ASHTON
HAROLD N. WILKINSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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